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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- END USE AND PRICE AS FACTORS IN
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
A New York public utility bought gas directly from pro-
ducers in Texas, a transaction not subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act.'
The gas was to be used to fire the purchaser's boilers in place
of coal to combat a serious air pollution problem. The purchaser
arranged with respondent pipe line company for the trans-
portation of this gas from Texas to New York. Respondent
applied to the Federal Power Commission for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity as required under Section 7 of
the Natural Gas Act.2 The Commission denied the certificate
on the grounds that the end use of the gas as a boiler fuel was
inferior, and the price paid by the purchaser in the direct sale
was high and would tend to force up the field prices of gas. The
court of appeals reversed, saying the Commission had exercised
a general conservation authority not granted by Congress.8 On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. The Commis-
sion did not abuse its discretion in considering the factors of
end use and price in denying a certificate of public convenience
and necessity. Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81 Sup. Ct. 435 (1961).
The jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the
Natural Gas Act extends to any transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, and to any sale, for resale in interstate
commerce.4 Before such activity can be engaged in, the natural
gas company seeking to perform such service must be granted
a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Commis-
1. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958): "The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,
to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-
gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production of gathering
of natural gas." (Emphasis added.)
2. 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
3. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 271 F.2d 942 (3d
Cir. 1959). See also Note, 60 COLum. L. REv. 1043 (1960).
4. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
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sion. 5 The act further provides that "a certificate shall be issued
to any qualified applicant therefor, . . . if it is found that the
applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and perform
the service proposed ... and that the proposed service ... is or
will be required by the present or future public convenience and
necessity."'6
In its certification proceedings under Section 7 of the Nat-
ural Gas Act, the Commission has, case by case, set certain
basic requirements which must be met by an applicant to show
that the proposed service is in the public convenience and neces-
sity. These usually include a showing of adequate reserves of
natural gas, sufficient markets, appropriate design of facilities,
and sound financing.7 In addition to these basic standards, each
case presents a variety of other factors that may have some bear-
ing on the public convenience and necessity.8 In each case the
Commission must determine which of the factors it can and
will consider, and what weight may be given to each.
In natural gas certification proceedings, the Commission or
the competing fuel and transportation interests have often con-
tended that the use of gas under boilers in place of coal is an
"inferior use"9 which depletes gas reserves'and causes unneces-
sary injury to the coal industry. Prior to the amendment of the
Natural Gas Act, the Commission was not receptive to these
5. 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
6. 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
7. E.g., Cities Service Gas Co., 17 F.P.C. 516, 520 (1957) ; Northern Natural
Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634, 1636 (1956) ; Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 F.P.C.
29 (1939).
8. Since the term "public convenience and necessity" is very imprecise in
giving the Commission concrete standards by which to judge each case, it seems
that the "public convenience and necessity" must be determined for each individual
case. Certain basic standards have been set, but each case presents a variety of
factors which must be considered in weighing its merits. In the instant case,
the Commission considered as bearing on the public convenience and necessity
such factors as inferior end use, high price, inability of pipelines buying for re-
sale to compete with industrial purchasers buying in direct sales, and preemption
of pipeline facilities by gas being used for boiler fuel to the detriment of pur-
chasers who would use the gas for "superior" uses. For an early discussion of what
may constitute the "public convenience and necessity," see Kansas Pipe Line &
Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29 (1939).
9. A general classification of the uses of natural gas into "superior" and
"inferior" would usually be as follows:
(1) Superior uses: Chemical production; domestic cooking and heating; com-
mercial uses; certain highly specialized industrial uses, where, because of its
qualities natural gas is of particular value;
(2) Inferior uses: General industrial use; employment for boiler fuel, the
generation of electricity, the making of cement, bricks, carbon black, and like
purposes.
See BLAOHLY & OATMAN, NATURAL GAS AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTS 120
(1947).
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arguments and expressed the opinion that "Congress did not
intend this Commission generally to weigh the broad social and
economic effects of the use of various fuels."' 0 However, since
the amendment of Section 7 of the act in 1942 expanding the
Commission's jurisdiction," these arguments have been given
more weight. Though injury to competing fuels has been given
some consideration,'12 the end use factor seems to be more im-
portant. The Commission has often expressed its feeling that
the use of natural gas as a boiler fuel is undesirable in most
cases, and that it should be allowed only on a positive showing
that it will be required by the public convenience and necessity. 13
Though this factor has been dealt with in many cases, the Com-
mission has not claimed to possess general conservation au-
thority and has maintained the position that end use is just
one factor to be considered in a certification case.' 4 As the court
of appeals pointed out, certification has been denied in few cases
where end use has been considered, 5 but the weight accorded
this factor seems to be increasing as the Commission becomes
more concerned with conservation.
In a sale for resale, the Commission has control over the
price paid for the gas. In a direct sale, however, the Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction, though it does have certification au-
thority over the transportation of the gas in interstate com-
merce. 16 Because of its lack of jurisdiction, the Commission has
seldom considered the price paid in a direct sale as a factor
weighing against certification of the transportation of the gas
10. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 57 (1939).
11. 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. 717f(c) (1958). Under the act before
amendment, the Commission was empowered to certify only those extensions
of natural gas facilities which moved into areas already being served by a natural
gas company. Under the amended act, the Commission has certification authority
over all extensions of facilities in interstate commerce.
12. See, e.g., Cities Service Gas Co., 17 F.P.C. 516, 523 (1957) ; Scranton-
Spring Brook Water Service Co., 17 F.P.C. 25, 35 (1956).
13. E.g., Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634, 1635 (1956) ; Mississippi
River Fuel Corp., 12 F.P.C. 109, 112 (1953) ; Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp.,
9 F.P.C. 70, 87 (1950).
14. Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81
Sup. Ct. 435, 443 (1961), quoting from Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co., 3
F.P.C. 574, 578 (1943). See also Cities Service Gas Co., 17 F.P.C. 516, 524
(1957), where the Commission said: "(T]he Natural Gas Act does not confer
upon the Commission authority to promulgate a national fuels policy, or to act as
the conservator of natural gas or of any other natural resource. The Commis-
sion's jurisdictional ambit is fixed and delinated by the requirement of the public
convenience and necessity."
15. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 271 F.2d 942, 950,
n. 27 (3d Cir. 1959).
16. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
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in interstate commerce. 1'7 In the Northern Natural Gas Com-
pany1' case, the hearing examiner, in denying certification for
transportation of gas sold directly to the consumer, considered
the price as a factor weighing against certification because it
was too low. The examiner felt that the sale of gas to industrial
consumers would deplete the gas company's reserves, forcing
them to purchase gas at a later date to meet general consumer
needs. Since the price of gas in the area was spiraling, the
feeling was that the reserves would have to be replaced at a
cost higher than the return the company was obtaining in the
sale in question, and that this would lead to higher prices for
general consumers. This decision was modified by the Commis-
sion 19 and later reversed on rehearing.20
The instant case is of concern to the natural gas industry
because it seems to represent a considerable extension of the
Commission's power to consider end use as a factor weighing
against certification. Though the Commission and the Court
contended that this is just Qne of the "countervailing factors"
which "suffice to tip the balance against the grant of authority
requested" by respondent,21 it would appear that it was the con-
trolling factor in this case. It seems that the difference between
power to "act as arbiter over the end use uses of natural gas" 22
and power to consider end use as a factor in a certification pro-
ceeding is simply a matter of degree, and that this decision
moves in the direction of more comprehensive power in the
Commission.
The consideration of price in this direct sale represents a
possible extension of Commission authority that could have an
even greater effect than the end use factor. Though direct sales
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under the
Natural Gas Act, this decision opens the way for consideration
of the price paid in such sales as a factor weighing against
certification of transportation of the gas so sold. By use of this
factor the Commission may express its disapproval of these non-
17. Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81
Sup. Ct. 435, 449 (1961). Note the analogies the Court draws from consideration
of non-jurisdictional facilities in determining a rate base. No direct authority is
cited.
18. 15 F.P.C. 673 (1955).
19. Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 682 (1956).
20. Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F.P.C. 1634 (1956).
21. Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81
Sup. Ct. 435, 447 (1961).




jurisdictional sales and possibly exert control over the prices
paid in them, or force the purchasers to conduct their business
through jurisdictional channels. 21 It seems evident that any such
power in the Commission was not authorized by Congress in the
Natural Gas Act.24
There appears to be no dispute about the fact that natural
gas is a wasting resource that would best be saved for homes
and specialized industrial uses which cannot be served by
cheaper and more abundant fuels such as coal.25 Since there is
a need for conservation of natural gas and Congress has granted
no general conservation authority to the Commission, 26 the Court
is apparently attempting to remedy the deficiency by allowing
the Commission to place more weight on the end use factor in
certification proceedings. 27 The Court is also attempting to fill
the gap that is created by the possibility of direct sales that
cannot be regulated by the Commission. It reasons that Congress
intended to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and since
the states have proven incapable of effectively regulating the
type of direct sale here in question, therefore Congress must have
intended for federal authority to govern.281 This interpretation
of the Natural Gas Act seems somewhat strained in light of the
fact that the act expressly excludes direct sales from federal
regulation. Perhaps this deficiency in the regulatory scheme
points the way for revision of the Natural Gas Act by Congress,
but it hardly seems to warrant judicial interpretation apparently
contrary to the language of the statute.29
Edward C. Abell, Jr.
23. The dissent in the instant case, while not denying the Commission the
right to consider the matter of effect on field prices in a certification proceeding
such as this, criticized the Court for allowing the Commission to class direct
sales in a group and declare them undesirable as a whole. This, said Mr. Justice
Harlan, tends to place direct sales at more of a disadvantage than jurisdictional
sales, since the Commission starts with the premise that they are undesirable.
The dissenters felt that the Commission should be restricted to a consideration
of the respective merits and demerits of each particular sale.
24. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958) (sale for resale).
25. BLAcHLY & OATMAN, NATURAL GAS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 142
(1947).
26. The Commission has recommended legislation amending the Natural Gas
Act "to provide specifically for control by the Commission of the end-use of
natural gas when required for national defense or to safeguard the available
supply," (33 F.P.C. Ann. Rep. 154 (1953)) and "to provide specifically for con-
trol by the Commission of the allocation of natural gas when required for national
defense or to safeguard the available supply in emergency situations." (35 F.P.C.
Ann. Rep. 182 (1955)). These requests have not thus far been granted.
27. Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 81
Sup. Ct. 435 (1961).
28. Id. at 449-50.
29. It seems possible that the direct sales Congress intended to exempt from
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